United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (Unctad) by Karen Smith & Ian Taylor

Author:Karen Smith & Ian Taylor [Smith, Karen & Taylor, Ian]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: International Relations, Trade & Tariffs, Political Science, General
ISBN: 9781134199747
Google: YCJ-AgAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 17481286
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2007-05-18T00:00:00+00:00

The broad context behind this was that by the time of Nairobi commodity prices had collapsed.30 The IPC sought agreements for 18 specific commodities with the key aim being stabilization of prices at a level remunerative to the producers and equitable to the consumers.31 A Common Fund would be established that would link individual international commodity agreements (ICAs), thus compensating shortterm weaknesses of any one agreement through the relative strength of others.32 However, there was a failure to agree on supporting any commodity other than rubber and this tardy response to negotiating details for individual commodities was mirrored by the long delay in establishing the Common Fund (see below).33 This can be directly related to the North’s reduced dependence (and hence vulnerability) on commodity power, excepting oil.

Indeed, the North sidetracked and delayed the whole IPC process. It was only in 1980 that the basic Article of Agreement was adopted, with an agreed fund to finance the Program, though its ratification was consistently put off. In what were to become familiar tactics within UNCTAD as the 1980s progressed, the North effectively blocked initiatives by simple inertia and it was only in 1989 that the fund actually came into existence. This reflected what Williams characterized as ‘‘Maximum demand from the G-77 tended to induce minimal response from Group B.’’34

Furthermore, the failure of the South to take advantage of the oil crises as a means to advance the NIEO fell right into the hands of the Northern elites, determined to maintain their privileges at all costs. Indeed, OPEC’s failure to push home any advantage accrued by the crisis surrounding the oil hike was a major strategic error. As Augelli and Murphy point out,

OPEC members did not use their resources as part of a complete strategy for consolidating power throughout the world economy. Rather than selectively and judiciously investing their wealth in ways that would bind new allies to [a counterhegemonic] bloc, most of the OPEC members relied upon private institutions that shared the core interests of the old historical bloc, international banks.35

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